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Resumen 
 
Este trabajo describe el impacto de la reciente recesión global sobre los clubs de la liga de fútbol 
inglesa. También explica las principales fuentes de ingresos y cómo esas fuentes se han visto 
afectadas por el entorno cambiante. Además, el trabajo revisa los principales gastos en los que 
incurren los clubs y las principales razones que los explican. Finalmente, proporciona indicaciones 
sobre el uso apropiado de los fondos para reducir el impacto de las recesiones globales en el 
futuro. 
 
Palabras clave: Crisis financiera; Liga de fútbol inglesa. 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper describes the impact of the recent global recession in English Premiership football 
clubs. It also explains the main sources of revenues and how these sources were affected by the 
changing environment. In addition, the paper reviews the major expenditures incurred by clubs and 
the main reasons for incurring the expenditure. Finally, the paper provides direction on the 
appropriate use of funds to reduce the impact of a global recession in future. 
 
Keywords: Financial crisis; English premiership football. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The recent global financial crisis had a number of impacts in several businesses. Most 
financial experts think the crisis has affected world leading industry, banking and that 
the failure of watchdogs has let that crumble to dust. Football is not immune to the 
troubles caused by this changing environment. However, economic fundamentals 
underpinning the football industry remain relatively resistant to the economic downturn. 
Revenues generated through club fanbases, long term broadcast and sponsorship 
contracts which are secured in advance may enable some clubs to run their business 
smoothly. Concerns have been raised about the impact of this crisis in English 
Premiership clubs. Traditionally, most football clubs in England had financial difficulties 
for a number of years. We will see background of these financial problems in the next 
section. 
 
In this paper, I concentrate on the recent global financial crises its main impact on clubs’ 
financial situation. The objective is to provide an understanding of football’s finances to 
both practitioners and academics in particular considering the impact recent global 
financial crisis on football firms. I use English premiership football as a laboratory to 
achieve this objective. This paper contributes to the understanding of financial crisis in 
the following issues. First, it reviews origins of financial problems in the English football 
sector. This provides information explicitly the way financial problems started in English 
football clubs. 
 
Second, it provides an understanding of financial sources and expenditures for football 
clubs with examples of recent revenue figures. All major sources of finance such as gate 
tickets, broadcasting and commercial revenues are explained. Besides, main expenditures 
such as investment in playing talent and stadium development costs are described. This 
paper also discusses key reasons that drive clubs to undertake massive investment in 
playing talent. Third, the paper identifies risk associated with revenues sources paying 
particular emphasis on the impact of global financial crisis. Finally, it notifies on main 
mistakes that are normally taken by most football clubs and how they can be avoided. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a brief background of financial 
problems in English football. Section 3 explains main sources of revenues in football 
clubs. Section 4 describes main expenditures. Section 5 explains the real financial 
situation of clubs. Section 6 presents the credit score ranking conducted by financial 
experts (Equifax). Section 7 discusses main investors in English premiership football. 
Section 8 provides conclusion with caveats on main mistakes typically done by most 
clubs. 
 
 
 
2. BACKGROUND OF FINANCIAL PROBLEMS 
 
The football league was established in 1888 as a step forward to handle financial 
difficulties in English football. The main purpose was to ensure clubs generate enough 
income to pay players’ salaries and other involved costs. Revenue increases rapidly in the 
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early 1900s when the game of football becomes more popular. This was attributed by 
the maximum player’s wage set at £4 per week in 1901. Additionally, the Football 
Association (FA) imposed a maximum transfer fee of £350 following the first ever £1000 
transfer fee of Alf Common from Sunderland to Middlesbrough in 1905 (Morrow, 
1999).  
 
Despite these controls small clubs remain in financial troubles. Most of these clubs were 
rescued by local businessmen with their small fortunes. Without these rescuers, clubs 
that are unable to pay its creditors can choose or forced to administration. However, this 
option was not pleasing for creditors because an administrator is entitled to pay himself 
or herself for his or her task and the charges are always high. 
 
Some clubs spent heavily to achieve success in early 1930s. The best example is Wigan 
which has a debt of £20,000 in 1931 after struggling to attract supporters, faced with 
strong competition from two Rugby League teams also located in the town (Buraimo, 
Simmons and Szymanski, 2006). In the 1940s, particularly after World War ІІ football 
enjoyed a boom as attendances reached all-time high. By the 1960s, football faces 
competitions from alternative leisure activities, and weaker teams began to face falling 
attendances. Furthermore, the FA abolished player’s maximum wage in 1961. This again 
leads to significant player salaries that cause greatest concerns on financial stability. For 
example, Accrington Stanley faced with debts of £62,000 in 1962 (Buraimo et al., 
2006). 
 
Another wave of financial disaster hit the Football League in early 1980s, after a 
combination of declining attendances and increasing player wages. Most small clubs 
were affected including Bradford City, Bristol City, Southend, Swansea and 
Wolverhampton. A report published in 1982 found 92 league clubs in England 
generating 6m operating loss (Buraimo et al., 2006). During this period, clubs with 
financial suffering were struggling negotiating wage cuts with players’ union and in 
many cases direct subsidies. Some clubs such as Aston Villa, Chelsea, Leeds United, 
Manchester City, and Nottingham Forest sold their stadia to local authorities. Despite 
this financial calamity, no club failed during this period. 
 
The Football league was in a much healthier state in the late-1980s after started 
generating revenue through sponsorship and TV deals in the mid-1980s. Prior to 1990s, 
it was not common for English clubs entering administration. Ideally, clubs with financial 
plight would sell players, reduce their aspirations and sometimes suffer relegation to 
lower divisions as a consequence. Administration became more common in the 1990s 
and early 2000s where more than thirty clubs were involved. For example, larger debts 
of £30m to £40m were accumulated by clubs in administration including Bradford City, 
Ipswich Town and Leicester City in early 2000s. Flotation which was common in the mid-
1990s was another way for clubs generating more revenue for financing stadium 
development and investment in player assets (Morrow, 1999). However, balancing 
demands of shareholders and on-the-field performances has proved difficult and some 
clubs have delisted. 
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3. WHAT ARE MAIN SOURCES OF REVENUE? 
 
 
This section review main sources of revenues generated by football companies. It is 
important to understand that clubs are not wholly consistent with each other in the way 
they classify revenue. Hence, I split revenue into three categories namely matchday, 
broadcast and commercial sources. Matchday revenue largely includes revenue from 
gate receipts (including seasonal tickets and membership). Broadcast revenue includes 
revenue from television and radio, from both domestic and international competitions. 
Commercial revenue includes sponsorship and merchandising revenues. Deloitte’s recent 
report shows that total Premier League revenue for 2007/08 season was £1,932m. The 
larger source of the revenue was from broadcasting contracts amounting to £931m. 
Matchday and commercial revenue amounted to £554m and £447m respectively. 
 
3.1. Matchday revenue 
 
Prior to huge broadcast deals in recent years matchday revenue was contributing a 
larger part of clubs’ finances. For example in 2005, Manchester United and Chelsea had 
42% and 38% respectively of their revenues accumulated from matchday sources. 
Basically, matchday revenue depends on ground capacity, attendance levels and ticket 
prices. In 2006, Manchester United’s matchday revenue increased with the expansion of 
its Old Trafford stadium capacity from 68,000 to 76,000. Despite the relative decline of 
gate receipts due to increase in television deals, Arsenal has successfully increased its 
finances since 2006’s move to Emirates stadium by maximising club's fanbase. The 
matchday and broadcast elements of football business are mutually dependent meaning 
that massive TV deals leads to fall of match attendances that reduces overall matchday 
revenue. 
 
3.2. Broadcast revenue 
 
Broadcasting revenue was the main driver of Premier League growth in 2007/08 season 
prior to deep global crisis. It is estimated that Sky and Setanta have paid a total of 
£1.7bn for domestic Premier League rights in 2008/09 season and overseas rights 
amount to £625m. The television rights for the Premier League are renegotiated every 
three years. The most recent deal relates to 2007 until 2010, with the Premier League 
poised to begin negotiations for the period from 2010 until 2013. Richard Scudamore, 
the chief executive of Premier League accepts that it is possible to have fluctuations in 
domestic rights, but expects the entire package to increase in the next deals (Wilson, 
2008). 
 
3.3. Commercial revenue 
 
Sponsors are essentially interested with increased awareness or direct marketing of their 
products or services. The aim is to achieve return on investment through increase in sales 
or business. Football clubs with larger supporter bases such as Arsenal and Manchester 
United are able to secure significant sponsorship deals because the sponsor is able to 
market its products directly to a larger number of supporters. This also increases its 
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awareness through media coverage of the clubs and the Premier League in general. It is 
clear that football clubs with global, regional and strong national profiles have a distinct 
advantage in the sponsorship market because it helps sponsors to reach a broad 
audience. 
 
Negotiations of sponsorship deals are free for all clubs. Most Premier League clubs have 
their own primary sponsors. For example, Arsenal’s primary sponsor is Emirates, one of 
the world’s leading airlines, Chelsea is sponsored by Samsung, an electronic goods 
manufacture and Manchester United is sponsored by American International Group 
(AIG), an international insurance and financial services company. Most of these 
sponsorship deals generate superbly profits. The most known is that of Manchester 
United with AIG that worth 56.5m over four years. The length of sponsorship contracts 
and packages vary from club to club, though shirt deals typically last for around four 
years. For example, Blackburn Rovers and West Ham United (three years), Stoke City 
(eleven years) and the longest contract is that of Liverpool and Carlsberg (fifteen years). 
 
 
 
4. WHAT ARE THE MAIN EXPENDITURES? 
 
 
4.1. Playing talent costs 
 
The main expenditure of any professional football club is the costs associated with 
playing talent. Players’ salaries take greater part of the total expenses incurred by a club. 
Financial losses in most clubs can be explained by excessive wage spending and inflated 
transfers registrations. For premiership clubs, extravagant player wages and overstated 
transfer fees are motivated by retention to the Premier League status and qualification to 
European competitions. Simmons and Forrest (2004) found positive correlation between 
wage bill and qualifications to European competitions. In fact, revenue that can be 
generated from European competition is an incentive to increase investment in player 
talent. The wage bill/turnover ratio has been fluctuating but has remained between 50% 
to 60%, see in (Deloitte and Touche. Annual review of football finance, various years). 
 
4.2. Stadium development costs 
 
Another significant expenditure relates to stadiums developments. According to Deloitte 
and Touche, a total of 1,473m have been used on stadia constructions and expansions 
for the period 1998-2007. The expenditure was dipped in 2006 following completion of 
Arsenal’s Emirates stadium and extension of Manchester United’s Old Trafford stadium. 
In particular, Arsenal spends considerable amount of its revenue to service the loan used 
on construction of a new stadium. Other Premier League clubs that plan building new 
grounds are Chelsea, Everton, Liverpool, Portsmouth, Tottenham and West Ham. 
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5. WHAT IS THE REAL SITUATION? 
 
 
5.1. The amount of debt 
 
Deloitte and Touch latest estimate for the Premier League's total debt was around 
£3.1bn. The debt at the biggest clubs is particularly large, with Arsenal, Chelsea, 
Manchester United and Liverpool accounting for almost £2bn. Deloitte’s report showed 
that a total of £1.2bn is a non-interest bearing soft loans from club owners. In 
particular, Chelsea’s debt is regarded as “soft loan” because it is owed to Roman 
Abramovich and not, therefore, "external". Arsenal’s debt relates to the loan used for 
constructions of Emirates stadium. Manchester United and Liverpool debts are 
associated with money borrowed during takeovers by American tycoons. The owners 
borrow money to finance the acquisition of these clubs. Net interest charges paid for the 
season 2007/08 were £188m which is about 6% of the overall debt balance. 
 
5.2. Sponsors’ level of risk 
 
The turnovers in the Premier League are relatively stable, particularly given the broadcast 
revenue and growing popularity of English premiership football. However, the sponsors 
are in various degrees of trouble. For example, AIG, the Manchester United shirt sponsor 
was recently the subject of a rescue deal from the US Federal Reserve and West Ham's XL 
sponsors have gone bust. The financial sector remains a major concern. The 
nationalisation of Northern Rock means Newcastle United is partly funded by taxpayers’ 
money. Britannia, which sponsors Stoke City for eleven years contract, has been exposed 
to risk by its trust on capital markets for the money it lends. The airline industry has been 
affected by shocks of thirty airlines closing within a year, but Arsenal sponsored by 
Emirates is unlikely to be too adversely affected because the airline has its reserves in the 
Middle East. 
 
Financial experts’ beliefs that electronics manufacturers such as Samsung sponsor of 
Chelsea, LG sponsors of Fulham and Garmin SatNav sponsors of Middlesbrough are 
operating on sturdy financial ground. More recently, business analysts suggest electronic 
companies will not hit too badly by the credit crisis as uncertain economic times prompt 
consumers to seek comfort in entertainment. Reebok and JJB, sponsors of Bolton 
Wanderers and Wigan Athletic respectively, are top sportswear companies in the world 
and are on a sound financial footing apart from the reduced spending in retail goods. 
 
Carlsberg sponsors of Liverpool and Chang sponsors of Everton are more likely to 
encounter problems as the government is acting more on binge drinking than the credit 
crunch. Blackburn’s Crown Paints sponsors have annual revenue of around £180m, and 
the company is targeting £200m revenues over the next two years. Hull’s sponsorship 
with Karoo, a local internet service provider, looks safe. The company arranges bills in 
the trend of rising household costs and has little local competition. Sunderland’s 
sponsorship with Boylesports is almost protected as the company is debt free and looks 
to expand its business to other countries. 
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5.3. The threat of ticket prices 
 
Ticket pricing is a sensitive issue simply because high prices may reduce attendance in 
football matches. It is obvious that ticket prices have been rising since the creation of the 
Premier League in 1992. According to Mintel (2008)’s report, clubs associate the rise of 
ticket prices with the quality of the product on and off the pitch and the level of 
demand for it. Recently, most football fans are reluctant to pay high ticket prices as a 
consequence of credit crunch.  
 
One best example of ticket price conflict is that of Queen Park Rangers and its supporters 
in 2008 where the club sanctioned £10 hike from its ordinary price of £40. Fans were 
unhappy to pay the sum for a single game. Under such circumstances the club can lose 
a lot of revenues if many of its supporters cannot afford the sum. Ideally, the ticket price 
depends on the reputation of the club and its particular game opponent. Queen Park 
Rangers plays in a second tier competition in England commonly known as 
“Championship League”. Thus, the club should consider the importance of the 
competition before setting the price.  
 
During the same season first tier clubs like Arsenal and Chelsea were charging £96 and 
£65 respectively. However, their fans were happy to pay the sum due to nature of the 
competition in the Premier League. This is an important area where clubs requires closer 
scrutiny prior setting ticket prices in every new season. According to Virgin Money 
Football Fans’ Inflation Index in 2009, the average cost of a matchday in the Premier 
League was £95.60 (Phillips, 2009). This figure is approximately 22.6% higher than it 
was in 2006. However, according to 2008’s report of Virgin Money Survey, the average 
matchday cost was £106.21. Therefore the 2009’s average matchday cost is about 10% 
lower than the 2008’s average matchday cost. In this instance, there was an indication 
that prices in football are falling.  
 
5.4. Broadcasting’s level of risk 
 
Broadcasting revenue increased significantly since the breakaway of top division clubs to 
form the Premier League in 1992/93 season. Prior to this formation, television revenue 
were shared in 50%, 25%, 12.5% and 12.5% for division 1, 2, 3 and 4 respectively 
(Buraimo et al., 2006). The purpose of the breakaway was to increase revenue in the 
Premier League. For the seasons 1992/93 to 2002/03, the Premier League’s share of 
revenue was 74%, compared to 18%, 6% and 2% for divisions 1, 2 and 3 of the Football 
League, respectively. But this does not mean that revenue is consistently guaranteed 
from TV deals. 
 
Setanta, one of the broadcaster in the English Premier League have gone bust since June 
2009 with around 30m debt. The broadcaster is also failed to pay 3m instalment due to 
Scottish Premier League. Accordingly, the Premier League has terminated its contract 
and now is selling the deal for the 2009/10 season. Apart from Setanta economic 
failure, other broadcasters such as Sky Sports and ESPN have relatively stable conditions 
and their revenues are expected to rise in the future. For example, the Premier League’s 
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oversees broadcasting deals are expected to double from 625m to 1.4bn in the next 
three years. This prospect reveals that the level of risk in broadcasting deals is fairly small.  
 
 
6. HOW DO FINANCIAL EXPERTS RANK PREMIERSHIP CLUBS? 
 
Equifax a credit rating agency have ranked premiership clubs during the season 
2008/2009 particularly at the mid and end of the season. Table 1 below presents the 
scores showing Arsenal and Manchester United were highly ranked while Portsmouth 
was poorly ranked during both periods. Apart from Chelsea and Liverpool which have 
large amount of debts, the rankings corresponds to individual club performance both 
on-field football success and off-field financial success. To the large extend, this credit 
score ranking roughly reflects the league position of each club in a particular period. 
 
The ranking shows that more than half of the teams in the Premier League have financial 
problems. The first ranked nine clubs have no financial problems while the last eleven 
clubs have insolvency problems. The main implication of this ranking is that clubs with 
insolvency problems they would struggle to pay-off the debts if everyone came at once 
to ask them. The credit ranking scores of Chelsea and West Bromwich Albion are two 
major surprises in the table. Chelsea was ranked as an insolvent club despite it’s on the 
pitch performance due to its massive debts from its owner Roman Abromovich. The 
logic is that, there might be severe financial problems if the current owner considers 
selling the club in the near future. On the other hand, regardless of its poor performance 
on the pitch, West Bromwich Albion, a newly promoted club has better credit rating of 
71 only below Manchester United and Arsenal. 
 
Table 1 
Premiership club credit scores 
 
  January 2009-Mid of the season May 2009-End of the season 
Club Score Rating Remark Insolvent Score Rating Changes 
Arsenal 98 A+ Very good No 98 A+ SAME 
Manchester 
United 93 A Very good No 100 A+ UP 
West Bromwich 
Albion 71 B Good No 78 B+ UP 
Tottenham 65 B- Good No 50 C- DOWN 
Blackburn 
Rovers 43 D Average No 68 B- UP 
Manchester 
City 40 D Average No 27 E DOWN 
Sunderland 37 D- Average No 37 D- SAME 
West Ham 37 D- Average No 37 D- SAME 
Liverpool 26 E 
Lower 
than 
average No 26 E SAME 
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Everton 18 F+ Low Yes 18 F+ SAME 
Stoke City 17 F+ Low Yes 2 F- DOWN 
Chelsea 10 F Low Yes 10 F SAME 
Middlesbrough 7 F Low Yes 7 F SAME 
Bolton 
Wanderers 5 F Low Yes 5 F SAME 
Newcastle 
United 5 F Low Yes 12 F UP 
Aston Villa 2 F- Low Yes 10 F UP 
Fulham 2 F- Low Yes 20 E- UP 
Wigan Athletic 2 F- Low Yes 2 F- SAME 
Hull City 1 F- Low Yes 1 F- SAME 
Portsmouth 0 F- Low Yes 2 F- UP 
 
Source: Equifax. 
 
 
 
7. WHO ARE POPULAR OWNERS/FINANCE PROVIDERS? 
 
Roman Abramovich is football’s well known owner in the English premiership football. 
However, recent takeovers at Manchester City and Portsmouth by Abu Dhabi United 
Group and Dr. Sulaiman Al-Fahim respectively, has ensured that there are now new 
arrivals in football with deeper pockets than even Chelsea's billionaire owner. Sheikh 
Mansour Bin Zayed Al Nahyan is the son of the founder of the United Arab Emirates and 
his family has an estimated potential wealth of £500bn compared to £13.2bn for 
Abramovich (Wilson, 2008). Dr. Sulaiman Al-Fahim is believed to be wealth as he plans 
to bring in new players, strengthen the club academy and set up relationships with clubs 
across the globe. 
 
American businessmen are also popular in football business. Manchester United owners, 
Malcolm Glazer family borrowed money to finance takeover of the club in 2005.  The 
family itself paid £284m in cash and the remained £559m were borrowed from their 
bank, JP Morgan and other three hedge funds namely, Citadel, Och-Ziff and Perry 
Capital (Conn, 2007). The money from the hedge funds was given at a very high interest 
rate. The club has been able to service the loan regardless of high interest rates and 
losses generated by their parent company, Red Football Joint Venture Limited. The club 
paid interest of £45.5m and the parent company confirmed loss of £44.8 for the year 
ended 2008. However, United’s profits are relatively high that has enabled the club to 
run smoothly by bringing in new players of sufficient playing talent. 
 
Liverpool co-owners, George Gillett and Tom Hicks borrowed money from Royal Bank of 
Scotland to finance acquisition of the club in 2007. Basically, the club had £44.8m debt 
when they took over in 2007. The owners have been in difficulties servicing the loan due 
to high interests and losses generated by their US-based parent company, Kop Football 
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(Holdings) Limited (Kelso and Smith, 2009). In actual fact, the club paid interest of 
£36.5m and the parent company suffered £42.6m loss for the year ended 2008. As the 
case, the owners have been in negotiations for further loans with RBS and Wachovia, the 
US-based bank. Recently, RBS has promised to extend credit facilities because the club is 
financially healthy and able to meet its debt obligations comfortably from cash flow 
generated by its playing and commercial activities. Other popular owners are Mohamed 
Al Fayed and Dave Whelan who have injected “soft loans” in Fulham and Wigan 
respectively. 
 
 
 
8. CONCLUSION 
 
We should all comprehend that, football clubs have long had difficulty borrowing. Why 
all this come about regularly? The answer to this question is speculation to win trophies. 
We heard scandal of Leeds United the way things went wrong. In reality, most 
premiership clubs spend too much in playing talent hoping to achieve success in 
trophies that brings sturdy financial situation in their accounts. However, not all clubs 
speculating will win titles, some yes and some no. Speculation itself is not a bad thing 
but poor acquisition strategy is. It is anecdotal to identify when a player is at his peak, 
but it is objective to identify when a player is at his best. In actual fact, buying a player at 
his best is a bad thing because is similar as buying a stock when there is a run of good 
news. Players bought at their best performance are too expensive and demand high 
wages that brings more costs to the club. This is the main oversight done by clubs. 
 
Another problem that seems to bring burdens to clubs is leveraged takeover strategy. 
Leveraged buyouts are legally accepted but had a number of drawbacks. The assets of 
acquired company are used as collateral for the borrowed funds and if not satisfactory, 
the assets of the acquiring company too. Manchester United and Liverpool are relevant 
examples of leveraged buyouts where most of their revenues are paid out as interest 
expense to service the loans taken during acquisitions. In fact, debt costs money and the 
more you have the more it costs. Fans who are customers of the football business are 
sceptical with leveraged buyouts. In plain terms, they associate high ticket prices with 
high interest payments rather than the credit crunch. It is too early to argue that 
leveraged buyouts are unsustainable in the football sector but the actual situation will 
soon be known. 
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